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To give proper effect to the rule, the Board would have to be on guard against a
premature finding that the strike is ended by placing an unwarranted reliance on
precedents based on this or other statutes covering termination of a strike for
other purposes. Under the proposed rule necessary administrative delay does
not operate to confuse the collective bargaining obligation, since this obligation
remains unchanged until the decision is announced. The operation of the
Wurlitzer and Taft-Hartley rules creates an interim period of confusion during
which the employer's obligation to bargain is suspended for want of an ascer-
tained party with whom to deal.
PROTECTION FROM DEFAMATION IN
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
One of the aims of the House Committee on Un-American Activities' has
been to "permit the greatest court in the world-the court of American public
opinion-to have an undirected, uncensored, and unprejudiced opportunity to
render a continuing verdict on all of its public officials and to evaluate the merit
of many in public life .... -12 The marked skill and success of the Committee in
pursuing this course have lead to widespread controversy.3 Regardless of the
but other factors are the extent of resumption of normal operations, the loss of business, and
the tort notion of whether there remains someone to benefit from the activity or whether its
object has "become no more than an effort to injure the employer"); The Determination of
When a Strike Is Ended, 38 Col. L. Rev. 676 (X938), noting Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor,
122 N.J. Eq. 593, 195 Atl. 819 (ig37) ("A strike is terminated when the places of strikers have
been filled with competent men, and the employer's business is operating in a normal manner
and to a normal extent"); cf. Rest., Torts § 776, comment b. (ig3g).
x Originally created as a special committee by H. Res. 282, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938), the
Un-American Activities Committee was continued by successive resolutions until 1945.
H. Res. 26, 7 6th Cong. ist Sess. (1939); H. Res. 3231, 7 6th Cong. 3d Sess. (194o); H. Res. go,
77th Cong. ist Sess. (1941); H. Res. 420, 7 7 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942); H. Res. 65, 78th Cong.
ist Sess. (i943). It was made a standing committee by H. Res. 5, 79th Cong. ist Sess. (i945),
and has since been authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 121(b)(x)(q),
6o Stat. 828 (1946). The purposes of the Committee were defined in these enactments as fol-
lows: "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is author-
ized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-
American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United
States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or
of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any
necessary remedial legislation."
2Interim Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities on the Hearings re-
garding Communist Espionage in the United States Government, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 1-2
(1948).
The professed aims of the Committee, its sincerity in espousing them, and the procedures
adopted have all been criticized. The leading work on procedure is Ogden, The Dies Committee
(2d ed., 1945), while differing viewpoints as to the Committee's worth are presented by Kahn,
Hollywood on Trial (1948); Cohn, Those Investigating Committees, reproduced in Thought
Control in U.S.A. 40 (1947); Letter from the members of the Yale Law School faculty to the
President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, reprinted in "Lawyer Schools" or "Policy Science"?: Yale Law School's Manifesto
Stirs Debate, 34 A.B.A.J. i5, x6 (1948); Gelhorn, Report on a Report of the House Committee
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value attributed to the Committee's latest discoveries, the need for protection
of individual privacy and reputation has been dramatized by recent events be-
ginning with the Committee's hearings at which Elizabeth T. Bentley and
Whittaker Chambers made their sensational charges concerning Communist
espionage in the government, 4 and culminating with publication and retraction
of accusations against Laurence Duggan.5
Whereas discussion and litigation have heretofore centered largely on at-
tempts to protect the recalcitrant witness from committee efforts to compel
testimony and the production of documents,6 these episodes indicate that pro-
tection of third parties against possible defamation by friendly witnesses or
Committee members currently constitutes a more pressing problem. Recon-
sideration of alternative safeguards against unwarranted damage to reputa-
tion is appropriate in view of the possibilities of legislative action suggested by
President Truman's publicized hostility to the Committee. 7 And, because the
Committee's practices have so frequently changed,' suggested reforms may best
be appraised in the light of the "Hearings regarding Communist Espionage in
the United States Government,"9 the latest chapter in the Committee's history.
Although many constitutional doubts have been raised as to the Committee,
it appears unlikely that direct constitutional attack will be successful."° And in
on Un-American Activities, 6ob Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1947); Liebling, The Whole Story, 24 New
Yorker, No. 38, at 134 (Nov. 13, 1948); Straight, Trial by Congress, ix9 New Republic, No.
7, at 6 (Aug. 16, 1948); Mundt, What Is Un-American Activity? Liberty 19 (Sept. 22, 1945);
What Is Americanism? N.Y. Times, § 4, p. 6, col. 3 (Dec. 26, 1948).
4 N.Y. Times, § I, p. i, col. 4 (Aug. i, 1948); N.Y. Times, § i, p. i, col. x (Aug. 4, 1948).
5 Chi. Daily Tribune, p. I, col. 2 (Dec. 21, 1948); Chi. Daily Tribune, p. i, col. i (Dec. 22,
1948).
6 See note io infra.
7The hearings have been characterized by President Truman as a "red herring." Chi. Daily
News, p. i, col. 7 (Dec. 9, 1948).
8 See Ogden, The Dies Committee (2d ed., 1945).
9 Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities regarding Communist
Espionage in the United States Government, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948).
10 It has been primarily the desire to afford privacy to the individual which has lead to the
attempts to impose constitutional restraints on the Committee's actions. Some of the argu-
ments have been addressed at the constitutionality of the investigations undertaken. Thus, it
has been claimed that the Committee's inquiries abridged free speech and inflicted punishment
without trial, while absence of any legislative purpose has also been urged as a defect. It has
been said that the investigation "as now authorized would necessarily have as its subject the
'private affairs of private citizens,'" and furthermore, that politically discriminatory adminis-
tration of the resolution authorizing the Committee has resulted in a denial of "equal protec-
tion." Finally, the contention has been raised that lack of an ascertainable standard of guilt
renders unconstitutional any conviction for contempt, a supposed result of the ambiguity of
the resolution defining the scope of inquiry. However, the constitutionality of the Committee
has been twice upheld in lower federal court opinions which the Supreme Court has refused to
review. Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (App. D.C., 1948), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 1511
(1948); United States v. Josephson, x65 F. 2d 82 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), cert. den. 333 U.S. 838
(1948), rehearing den. 333 U.S. 858 (1948). Other suggested constitutional limitations spring
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any event, unless it succeeds in eliminating the Committee altogether, it will not
afford significant protection against defamation.- A more responsible press 2 and
improvement in the caliber of Committee personnel3 would of course reduce
the need for extensive reform, but these offer little hope of early or permanent
realization. Increased power to control the effects of defamatory testimony
must be lodged in either the party defamed or the courts. Reform proposals to
be examined in this note are then of two types: legislative reform of the Com-
mittee's procedure designed to equalize the positions of the accuser and ac-
cused in the forum provided by the Committee itself, and the imposition of
criminal or civil sanctions on the person responsible for defamation.
I
Of the numerous proposals for legislative reform of congressional committees
embodied in bills introduced in Congress,4 the reports of bar associations,' s and
from rights available to witnesses in any investigation. Protection may be afforded by the re-
quirement that the question asked be pertinent to the inquiry and through safeguards provided
by the searches and seizures clause and the privilege against self-incrimination. For discussion
of constitutional law issues raised with regard to either type of limitation see Validity of the
Un-American Activities Committee Inquiries into Professional and Political Affiliations, 46
Mich. L. Rev. 521 (1948); Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, 47 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1947); Congressional Contempt Power in Investigations into the
Area of Civil Liberties, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 256 (i947). For detailed discussion of self-
incrimination, see Applicability of Privilege against Self-incrimination to Legislative In-
vestigations, 49 Col. L. Rev. 87 (i949).
11 Even should the Committee be declared unconstitutional, Congress would still undoubt-
edly be able to conduct investigations as to the subject of espionage in the government. Any
court pronouncement would probably limit only the power of a committee to compel testimony
from recalcitrant witnesses. Thus opportunity might still exist for defamation by the friendly
witness. It must also be remembered that the assertion of a purported constitutional privilege
may seriously prejudice the witness in the eyes of the public. For example, refusal to testify
on the ground of possible self-incrimination is often considered tantamount to a confession.
See statement of Representative Rankin, Hearings before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities regarding Communist Espionage in the United States Government, 8oth
Cong. 2d Sess., at 594 (1948): "If you had committed no crime your testimony would not in-
criminate you. I have been a prosecuting attorney and I have never seen a man refuse to an-
swer questions on the ground that they would incriminate him except when he had committed
a crime himself." Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- See Liebling, The Wayward Press, 24 New Yorker, No. 27, at 40 (Aug. 28, 1948); No. 28,
at 54 (Sept. 4, 1948); No. 35, at 78 (Oct. 23, 1948).
,3 The Democratic Committee on Committees has recently adopted resolutions barring
chairmen of other committees and non-lawyers from serving on the Un-American Activities
Committee and thereby removed Representatives Rankin and HFIbert. N.Y. Times, § i,
P. 14, col. 6 (Jan. 18, x949). Two other Committee members, Representatives Vail and McDow-
ell, were defeated in bids for re-election.
14 Measures rejected by the last Congress included S. Con. Res. 44, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess.
(1948), introduced by Senator Lucas of Illinois, and H.R. 4641, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1948),
introduced by Rep. Holifield of California. The major provisions of both, as well as a number
of additional rules, are contained in H.R. 74, 8xst Cong. ist Sess. (1949).
XS New York City Bar Ass'n, Committee on the Bill of Rights, Report on Congressional
Investigations (1948), recommended for legislative enactment requirements that the subject
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the writings and speeches of individuals, x6 the most extensive in scope is the bill
introduced in the Eighty-first Congress by Representative Holifield of Cali-
fornia. 7 The Holifield Bill which incorporates virtually all of the major pro-
posals for reform would secure to any person who believed that his reputation
had been harmed by testimony given in a public hearing before any congres-
sional committee the right to file with the committee a sworn statement to be
made part of the record of the hearings and the right to testify personally in his
own behalf. He would also be given the right to compel the committee to secure
of any investigation be announced before hearings were commenced and only relevant evidence
be elicited, that accurate stenographic record be kept of all testimony, and that no photo-
graphs, moving pictures, television or radio broadcasting of the proceedings be permitted
while a witness was testifying. Rights to be granted the witness included that of counsel, of
making written or oral statements supplementing testimony, and of free access to the record
of his testimony. The person harmed was to be afforded the privileges of filing sworn statements
with the committee, appearing personally to testify in his own behalf, and of cross-examining
adverse witnesses for a limited period of time. A further power to be granted him, the right to
have the committee call witnesses in his behalf, was to be subject to the committee's discretion.
Procedural principlesfor committee adoption were suggested in Recommendations for the Pro-
tection of Civil Rights in Legislative Investigations, 3o Chi. Bar Rec. 71 (1948). They included
granting to the witness the right to counsel, and requirements that formal hearings be public
and that secret, preliminary conferences be used to avoid unnecessary injury to reputation. It
was suggested that persons harmed be given the right to file sworn statements and that no
hearirgs be conducted without at least two committee members present. Witnesses would be
given the right to challenge subpoenas by motion before the committee. Testimony of wit-
nesses would have to be of "substantial probative force" and, where reasonable, about facts
within their knowledge. No inquiry would be made as to unexpressed beliefs of private in-
dividua Is. Finally, committee reports would be limited by requirements that a report be essen-
tial to I he legislative purpose of the investigation, that a majority of the committee consent to
its issuance, and that it be based only on evidence presented at public hearings.
x6 Moderate curbs were proposed by Judge Wyzanski in a recent magazine article, Defects
of Congressional Investigations, 38 Fortune, No. 5, at i8o (Nov. 1948). The author thought
that a statute setting out the "minimum standards for a legislative inquiry" would include
"the right of the witness to have counsel present, to file a written statement before the hearing
concluded, to have an accurate record kept of his own testimony, and to have public reports
of the committee based only on public evidence." Other reforms worthy of "professional con-
sideration" but not practical at present: a private person would not be compelled to testify
in camera unless the majority of the committee explicitly ruled that the public interest required
that the testimony be kept secret; a witness would not be compelled to testify unless more than
one committee member was present; a person criticized would be allowed to file with the com-
mittee "a limited number of written interrogatories" which would have to be answered in writ-
ing by the hostile witness, unless the majority of the committee directed otherwise; and no
private persons would be compelled to testify unless the majority of the committee approved
the issuance of a subpoena. That not all members of the Thomas Committee were themselves
insensitive to criticisms of its procedure is indicated by Rep. Nixon's remarks before the New
York Herald Tribune Forum. He there suggested a pattern for congressional committee in-
vestigations under which individual rights would be protected. Any individual named as a
possible loyalty risk would have an equal opportunity to present his side of the case in the same
forum where accused; he would have the right to counsel at all times, the right to present wit-
nesses in his own behalf, and to make statements pertinent to the issues involved; and further-
more, no report involving an individual's loyalty would be issued by the committee until hear-
ings had been held and the individual had had an opportunity to appear. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
§ 10, p. 53, col. 5 (Oct. 24, 1948).
z7 H.R. 74, 81st Cong. Ist Sess. (i949).
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the appearance of a limited number of witnesses requested by him whom he
might examine either personally or by counsel. Witnesses whose testimony ad-
versely affected him could be cross-examined for a limited length of time, again
either personally or by counsel. No person would be compelled to testify or pro-
duce documents unless a majority of the committee approved the issuance of a
subpoena; secret hearings could be held only upon an order of a majority of the
committee, and then only in the event that two members were present in addi-
tion to the interrogator. All witnesses would be granted the right to counsel and
to make relevant oral statements or to file sworn ones at the conclusion of their
testimony. They would also be entitled to stenographic transcripts of their re-
ported testimony, which would necessarily include all testimony given in public
hearings. Any witness whose testimony was impeached would be permitted to
question the impeaching witness by means of written interrogatories, though the
extent of this privilege would be subject to committee discretion. Furthermore,
the committee would have to advise witnesses of their constitutional rights to
withhold information, and furnish an opportunity to present through counsel
written motions and oral arguments when a privilege was claimed. A witness
would be adjudged of contempt only upon a majority vote at a committee meet-
ing called for that purpose. The bill further provides that the committee receive
only evidence that is relevant to the subject of the hearings and that reports
be filed or published only after approval at a committee meeting. Another pro-
vision would prevent committee members or employees from publishing state-
ments adversely commenting on any person until he had been advised of his
alleged misconduct and given a reasonable time to present a sworn statement.
The release of such statements would be subject to approval at a meeting by
a quorum of the whole committee. Finally, committee members and employees
would be prohibited from speaking or writing for compensation about any
phase of the committee's activities.
Because the proposed reforms would apply to all congressional committees,
there has been considerable anxiety over the burdens which would thereby be
placed on congressional investigations. It is generally agreed that such investi-
gations are essential at least in obtaining the information necessary for law-
making and in promoting responsible government by congressional supervision
of the executive department. 8 It is true that the obstructionist witness could
manipulate these safeguards to delay and confuse the proceedings.'9 It might be
well to have a less rigorous set of rules for congressional investigations which
is For general discussion of this problem, see Ogden, The Dies Committee, c. i (2d ed.,
1945); McGeary, Developments of Congressional Investigative Power (i94o); Dimock, Con-
gressional Investigating Committees (1929); Eberling, Congressional Investigations (1928);
Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study, ix
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i, 117 (I943-44); Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 4o Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926); Frankfurter, Hands off Congressional
Inquiries, 38 New Republic 329 (1924).
'9 For an analysis of the difficulties which can occur in multiple party proceedings, see The
Sedition Trial: A Study in Delay and Obstruction, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 691 (1948).
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do not involve "subversive" activity. But even though this may not be politi-
cally feasible, it does not seem probable that these proposed restrictions would
seriously handicap effective investigation. Some check against deliberate pro-
cedural abuse would be provided by public opinion. Common-sense notions of
justice and fair play argue for the adoption of these rules.30 And if they are to
be effective they should be codified by statute and thus placed beyond the reach
of the whims of a particular committee.21
But excessive optimism that statutory reform will eliminate possible defama-
tion does not seem warranted when it is recognized that many of the proposed
rules were observed during the Communist espionage hearings. Thus, witnesses
were allowed to read prepared statements before the Committee,- and the dep-
ositions and letters of persons unable to appear were printed in the record.23
Although not apprised of the charges beforehand,24 all persons accused during
public hearings of participating in Communist espionage activities were given
the opportunity to appear and testify in their behalf.25 The right to introduce
favorable witnesses26 and to cross-examine opposing ones was denied'27 but when
20 The rule requiring that committee members or employees obtain committee permission
before commenting adversely about anybody is of doubtful desirability since it could easily
lead to the gagging of minority members of committees. The need underlying the other rules
is amply illustrated by the past record of the Un-American Activities Committee. See Ogden,
The Dies Committee (2d ed., 1945); Kahn, Hollywood on Trial (1948); Gelhorn, Report on a
Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1947).
For a critique of the procedure used in the Kerr Committee's investigation of the loyalty of
government employees see Cushman, The Purge of Federal Employees Accused of Disloyalty,
3 Pub. Admin. Rev. 297 (i943).
21 See Representative Thomas' statement regarding the present situation. Hearings before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities regarding Communist Espionage in the
United States Government, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 1310 (1948). "The rights you have are the
rights given you by this committee. We will determine what rights you have and what rights
you have not got before the committee."
2Ibid., at 589, 642, 699, 723, 767, 8o5, 841, 852, 878, 907, 913, 916, 928.
23 Ibid., at 1358-61. 24 Ibid., at 657-58, 878.
25 See House Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6; House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 9, at 537. Representative Hcbert's
views expressed in the latter reference seemingly represented the position of the majority of
the Committee. "If anybody puts in jeopardy an individual who is charged with being a Com-
munist, I think, in fairness, that this individual should be allowed his day in court here in pub-
lic hearing as well. Now if you were in secret session or executive session, and these names were
used, then we owe them no obligation, but the minute that we allow a witness on the stand to
mention any individual, that individual has a right to come before this committee and have his
day in court...."
26A list of prospective witnesses submitted by Alger Hiss was disregarded by the Com-
mittee. Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities regarding Com-
munist Espionage in the United States Government, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 1162-65 (1948).
These were in the nature of character witnesses, however, and the Committee's actions do not
necessarily reflect on its expressions of willingness to examine witnesses for the purpose of cor-
roborating the "facts." Ibid., at 987, 1090-92.
27 Ibid., at 926. The reason given for the Committee's actions by Representative Mundt is
itself in need of explanation. "The position of this committee has been ... that we are not
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requested the Committee did ask the adverse witness questions submitted by
the accused.28 It also appears that transcripts of testimony could be obtained
by witnesses.29 Moreover, all of the witnesses were granted the right to counsel,
though generally attorneys were not allowed to participate in the proceedings to
the extent of personally interposing objections to questions.3° These safeguards
did not prevent harm to reputation in cases where proof was inconclusive, nor
does it seem likely that compliance with the other provisions of the Holifield
Bill would have prevented such injury.
No fact-finding agency could be expected to be infallible, but the hearings
indicate further that procedural rules cannot insure a fair hearing in this area.
Defects in the Committee's procedure were manifest notwithstanding the ob-
servance of so many of the suggested rules. Friendly witnesses were not properly
cross-examined3' while hostile witnesses were often browbeaten.32 The failure
functioning as a court, don't have the power, unfortunately, that a court does have, and so we
have not made it a policy to cross-examine witnesses or to permit counsel to do so. Had we the
full authority of a court, certainly it would be easier to get down into the disputed evidence in
this particular case. Since we do not have, we cannot adapt ourselves to part of the rules of the
court without having the authority that goes with being a court ......
28 The questions submitted by Alger Hiss were asked of Whittaker Chambers. Ibid., at
1165-67, ii96-X200.
29 Ibid., at 1o96, 1116. It may be noted that the witness involved, Alger Hiss, raised some
question as to the Committee's cooperation.
30 A clear statement of the Committee's position was made by Representative Nixon. "The
procedure of this committee is that the witness has the right to have counsel. The witness, when
he is asked a question may at any time consult with counsel, and counsel may advise him as to
whether or not there are any constitutional objections to the question which is being phrased.
The witness may state his objection in refusing to answer the question or in qualifying his an-
swer in any way; but the procedure of the committee does not allow for counsel to interpose
objections to questions during the course of a hearing, or to present answers to questions or to
make arguments. The witness has a perfect right to consult counsel on every question if he
wishes, but the witness must take the initiative in that respect." Ibid., at io16. In this par-
ticular instance the witness' attorney was eventually allowed to state the objection. However,
Committee members were often quite hostile to the idea, as shown by Representative Rankin's
remark, "I want to congratulate the witness that ... he didn't bring a lawyer here to tell him
what to say." Ibid., at 659. Cf. Attorney Braverman's experiences, ibid.,at 12i6, i3o9, 1343-44.
3, The cross-examination of Whittaker Chambers presents a notable exception to this
tendency. See particularly, ibid., at 661-72. Questioning directed only at matters of opinion
was too often evidenced. An example is found in the questions which Representative Rankin
asked Miss Bentley about Communism. Ibid., at 543-44. These culminated in the following:
"In other words, it is nothing but a system of abject slavery, dominated by a racial minority,
as members of the Politburo; is that correct?" As to the type of evidence admitted virtually
unquestioned, Representative Rankin's remarks concerning the case of Laughlin Currie are
instructive. "[V]e have put in the whole day accepting from an ex-Communist... testimony
relayed through two Communists as to what this man Currie in the White House is supposed
to have said. Now, that looks to me as if we are going pretty far afield when we take that kind
of testimony and charge this all up to Mr. Currie.... But here we put in a whole day...
smearing Currie by remote control through two Communists, either one of whom you admit
would swear to a lie just as soon as he would swear to the truth if it suited his purposes, and re-
layed to you [Miss Bentley], who at that time was a member of the Communist Party." Ibid.,
at 557.
32 Ibid., at 1329-46.
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to conclude the inquiry, to prove or reject charges made, allowed possibly un-
founded suspicions of guilt to settle indefinitely on the reputations of all in-
volved.3 And the willingness of the Committee to permit virtually anyone to
use its facilities to denounce others as un-American34 unduly enhanced the
possibility for defamation. The lesson is clear: many of the avenues by which
committee bias may lead to unfairness cannot be closed by legislative rules.
Too great a curtailment of the discretion indispensable to legislative inquiry
would be necessary. Moreover, procedural rules are difficult to enforce. Unlike
administrative agencies congressional committees do not make determinations
of legal status which can be reviewed by an appellate tribunal,3s and it is im-
probable that Congress would inflict penalties on its own members. Public
opinion, therefore, remains as the principal safeguard.
II
A criminal prosecution for perjury36 most readily comes to mind as a judicial
corrective; it has been relied upon by the Un-American Activities Committee
as a sufficient guarantee that the truth will be established from conflicting
testimony.37 Yet the penalties for this crime have proved a very ineffective detri-
ment to lying under oath.3 Requirements for the proof of perjury are even more
33 This criticism must be qualified in light of the possibility that recently uncovered docu-
mentary evidence may substantiate the accusations made by Whittaker Chambers. Neverthe-
less, the record of the hearings indicates that no conclusive proofs were intended or expected
by the Committee. See ibid., at zi59, where Representative Mundt told Alger Hiss: "This
Committee never had any illusions that we would be able to prove definitely whether or not
you are a Communist because, in dealing with people charged with being Communists over a
period of years, we have found that those who are guilty, refused to admit it and dodged the
question, or deliberately lied.... We know that we cannot get their membership cards, but
that was a point we could nothope to establish by verifiable evidence, and it is now a point in
dispute." But cf. House Committee on Un-American Activities, ioo Things You Should Know
about Communism in the U.S.A., at 11 (1948): "62. How can a Communist be identified? It is
easy. Ask him to name ten things wrong with the United States. Then ask him to name two
things wrong with Russia. His answers will show him up even to a child. Communists will de-
nounce the President of the United States but they will never denounce Stalin."
34 See Representative H6bert's oration on credibility of witnesses. House Committee on
Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 9, at 952. "We have to have people like Chambers
or Miss Bentley to come in and tell us. I am not giving Mr. Chambers any great credit for his
previous life. I am trying to find out if he has reformed. Some of the greatest saints in history
were pretty bad before they were saints. Are you going to take away their sainthood because of
their previous lives? Are you not going to believe them after they have reformed? I don't care
who gives the facts to me, whether a confessed liar, thief, or murderer, if it is facts."
3s For description of the elaborate system of review provided in the federal loyalty program,
see Abbott, The Federal Loyalty Program, 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 486 (1948); but see Emerson
and Helfeld, Loyalty among Government Employees, 58 Yale L.J. 1 (1948).
36 I8 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1948).
37 House Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 9, at 951, 953; House
Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14. One witness, Alger Hiss,
has been indicted for perjury. Chi. Daily News, p. I, col. 7 (Dec. 6, 1948).
38 See McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727 (194o); Scott, Noth-
ing but the Truth, 7 Mass. L. Soc. J. 12 (1936); Hibschman, You Do Solemnly Swear, 24 J.
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stringent than those necessary in the case of murder. It is not enough to present
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the government must
show that the statement was false "by the testimony of two independent wit-
nesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances."3 9 It is manifestly diffi-
cult to prove that testimony concerning political beliefs or alleged espionage
activity is false, particularly when the testimony relates to events which oc-
curred, if at all, many years ago; no statute of limitations applies to the activi-
ties of an investigating committee. An equally grave disadvantage of perjury
prosecutions common to all criminal proceedings, is the necessity of relying on
government officials to bring action.40 The possibility that the officials may be
subjected to varied political pressures cannot be overlooked.
Imposing tort liability for defamation would be a possible supplement to the
criminal sanctions of perjury. However, it is generally considered that an abso-
lute privilege attaches to all defamatory matter published in the course of legis-
lative proceedings, including committee hearings.4' In the case of congressmen
the immunity is expressly granted in the Constitution.42 However the extension
of absolute privilege to press releases publicizing in advance the future pro-
ceedings of a congressional committee seems doubtful,43 and there is authority
that the immunity given legislators does not extend to the re-publication of
statements made during the proceedings.44
But the position of the witness before a committee is most vulnerable. The
authority for the proposition that such a witness is absolutely protected from
Crim. L. 9o (x934); Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 Col. L. Rev. 67 (i9o8); Problem
of Successful Perjury, 78 Sol. J. 423 (i934).
s" Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 6o6, 607 (1945). The rule has been strongly criticized
in 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2040-43 (3d ed., i94o). As to differences in the law in other juris-
dictions, see McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727, 745-46 (1940).
40 In the most exhaustive study of the problem, disinterest of the officials responsible for
prosecuting was found more troublesome than over-technicality of the law. McClintock, What
Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727, 750-53 (1940).
41 See Prosser, Torts 827-29 (1941). Representative Nixon's concise restatement of the law
is of interest. "It is my opinion if a statement is made to an investigative officer not under sub-
poena, but voluntarily, voluntarily by the witness, that the statement would not be privileged.
If the statement is made in this hearing, of course, it is privileged." House Committee on Un-
American Activities, op. cit. supra note 9, at 989.
42 U.S. Const. Art. i, § 6: ".... and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [the
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." See Cochrane v.
Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783 (App. D.C., i93o), cert. den. 282 U.S. 874 (1930).
43 The Supreme Court in Kibourn v. Thompson, io3 U.S. i68, 2o4 (i88o), although stating
that the privilege was not limited to words spoken in debate, went no further than to say that
"[tihe reason for the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that
body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in
speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the tellers.
In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to
the business before it."
44 Rex v. Creevy, I M. & S. 273 (1813); Rex v. Abingdon, i Esp. 226, Peake 236 (i794);
Rest., Torts § 59o , comment b (1938).
NOTES
libel and slander suits is surprisingly scant.45 The courts have not considered
this privilege as an extension of that accorded the legislator but have based it
on the analogy of the immunity granted statements by a witness in a judicial
proceeding.46 Retrospectively, this development seems improper. Not only is
remedial legislation desirable, but a persuasive argument can be directed against
the rule in those courts where it has yet to be conclusively established.
The differences in the positions of judicial and legislative witnesses justify
different rules of privilege. Enforcement of the rules of evidence, effective guar-
antees of thorough cross-examination, and the probability of a more impartial
hearing in a judicial proceeding underline these differences. In addition there is
a greater likelihood that all controverting evidence will be presented. Criminal
prosecutions often must be initiated by a grand-jury indictment47 and, unlike
many committee investigations, legal proceedings are resolved by a final ver-
dict which ordinarily will be given much more publicity and credence than
charges made in the course of the trial. Moreover, the widespread publicity
afforded legislative investigations gives the congressional witness a far greater
power to harm than his legal counterpart.48 The limited procedural reforms
proposed would by no means obliterate these differences. Privileges in the law
of defamation are based on the belief that the benefits to the public of free speech
will outweigh the harm which may result to individuals.49 But congressional
investigations have upset this balance. Because of the greater probability of
harm it is submitted that public policy will best be served if a greater measure
of protection is accorded to the individual by conferring only a qualified privilege
on congressional witnesses.
The utility of thus extending the area of liability for defamation remains to
be considered. The defendant witness would not necessarily be put to the truth
of his accusations, for liability would still be conditioned on a showing by the
plaintiff that there had been an abuse of a qualified privilege. This can be es-
tablished by proving such matters as lack of belief by the defendant in the truth
of the defamatory statements, the absence of reasonable grounds for so be-
lieving, or improper motives in making the accusations. so The burden of going
45 Sheppard v. Bryant, i91 Mass. 591, 78 N.E. 394 (i9o6); Goffin v. Donnelly, 6 Q.B.D.
307, 5o L.J.Q.B. 303 (i88i); Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375 (1869); Kelly v. Daro, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 418, i18 P. 2d 37 (1940) (decided under the civil code of that state).
46 See cases cited note 45 supra; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceedings, io Col. L. Rev. 131, 137 (1910).
47 Proceedings before grand juries are of course secret. See Am. Law Inst., Code of Criminal
Procedure § 143 (1943).
48 Some judicial proceedings have undoubtedly been more widely publicized than some
legislative investigations; it is a differential between averages which is important.
49 See Rest., Torts c. 25, tit. b, introductory note (1938); Harper, Torts § 247 (i933);
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, io Col. L.
Rev. 131 (1gio).
so Rest., Torts §§ 6oo, 6oi, 6o3 (1938); Prosser, Torts 849-51 (1941).
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forward with the evidence is not so heavy as to nullify the remedy. While it is
true that the fallibility of juries and the time lag inherent in any action for dam-
ages render the remedy imperfect,s the threat of liability would at least be a
partial deterrent to the conscious liar.52
The cost of imposing procedural and judicial restrictions on congressional in-
vestigations, namely the loss of information otherwise available to the public,
does not seem prohibitive. The fear is rather that the reforms will not be ade-
quate to protect against unwarranted damage to reputation. Unfairness results
not alone from activities within the committee room, but also from a public
opinion which is swift to condemn where the charge is one of subversive ac-
tivity. But since committee actions have a significant share in the molding of
public opinion, the suggested reforms may well serve to alter the popular pro-
pensity to exaggerate the charges and to pronounce judgment without evidence,
and remind us to be patient in judging those who are suspect and whom we
do not like.
THE STATUS OF HOTELS UNDER THE FEDERAL
HOUSING AND RENT ACT*
The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947' was enacted by Congress in order
s, It might also be thought that a possibility of injustice is inherent in a plan to abrogate
absolute privilege as a result of the power of the legislative committee to compel testimony.
It is possible that a witness under subpoena might be forced against his will to make defama-
tory statements that he believed true, while he would be unable to prove either the truth of
the statement or non-abuse of his privilege. Such a remote possibility seems best prevented by
a legislative rule granting a witness at a public hearing the privilege of refusing to make pos-
sibly defamatory statements. A hearing might result in which the names of persons accused of
wrongdoing would be withheld; it would find its prototype in Miss Bentley's testimony before
the Ferguson Committee. Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, on Export Policy and Loyalty,
8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948). This privilege from testifying should not extend to secret or execu-
tive sessions, though the committee should not be permitted to publish statements made dur-
ing such proceedings without the permission of the witness. A further advantage in enacting a
rule permitting refusal to utter defamatory remarks is to be found in the aid it would give the
courts in rejecting a rule of absolute privilege that was prompted in large part by the fact that
witnesses in legislative investigations could be compelled to testify. Thus, the rule of Wright v.
Lathrop, 149 Mass. 385, 21 N.E. 963 (i889), allowing only a qualified privilege to the witness
who volunteered unsolicited information might be found controlling. To be weighed against
these advantages is the slight possibility that harmful defamatory silence might result from
refusing to answer questions on this ground.
S2 It should be noted that Whittaker Chambers repeated charges made during the hearings
in a radio broadcast for the purpose of giving Alger Hiss an opportunity to sue. N.Y. Times, §i,
p. i, col. 2 (Sept. 28, 1948).
* This note deals with the 1947 and 1948 Acts. Recent legislation extending controls leaves
unresolved many of the problems raised by the earlier legislation, and is discussed in an ad-
dendum, infra p. 566.
x 61 Stat. 193 (1947), 5o U.S.C.A. §§ i891-96, 1898-1903 (Supp., 1947). The Act was ex-
tended for thirty-one days by Public Law 422, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§§ 3884(a), I894(a), (f), and subsequently amended by the Housing and Rent Act of 1948,
62 Stat. 93 (I948), 5o U.S.C.A. § 512 (Supp., 1948). For an analysis of the entire Act see
Willis, The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 47 Col. L. Rev. ir18 (1947). The 1948
Act expired March 31, 1949.
